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Is the core provision of the Voting Rights Act 
unconstitutional? Many people now think that the Acts 
preclearance requirement is invalid, but Professor Karlan is not 
among them. In part, that is because she is not convinced the 
problems that originally motivated Congress to impose 
preclearance have been fully remedied. Professor Karlan points 
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out the many ways section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
shapes behavior in the jurisdictions subject to the statutenot 
just by blocking discriminatory electoral changes, but also by 
influencing less transparent conduct by various political actors 
operating in these regions. Do not be so sure, she tells us, that 
opportunities for minority political participation would not 
deteriorate absent the constraints imposed by section 5.1 
I share that sentiment, although Professor Karlan and I 
differ on how it informs the legality of reauthorization. For 
Professor Karlan, what matters is that Congress thought that 
minority political participation in covered jurisdictions would 
suffer were the statute to expire.2 When a legal challenge to 
reauthorization makes its way to the Supreme Court, as one 
inevitably will, Professor Karlan maintains that the Justices 
should simply defer to Congresss judgment that section 5 
remains necessary. She writes, Congress should have the 
authority . . . to conclude that the course of treatment is not yet 
fully complete and to prescribe another round of medicine.3 
Professor Karlan, of course, knows that the Supreme Court 
accorded Congress no such deference in City of Boerne v. Flores 
and the five related decisions that followed. Decided between 
1997 and 2001, City of Boerne and its progeny struck down 
portions of six federal statutes and flatly rejected Congresss 
judgment that particular statutory remedies were needed. In 
each case, the Court found that Congress failed to document 
constitutional violations pervasive enough to warrant the federal 
proscriptions and remedies it attempted to construct.4 As a 
result, it is widely assumed that the fate of section 5, as 
reauthorized, will hinge on whether the record Congress amassed 
to support reauthorization documents the continuance of 
pervasive, or at least significant, unconstitutional conduct for 
which preclearance offers a remedy.5 
                                                          
 1. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and 
Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007). 
 2. See id. at 29. 
 3. Id. at 31. 
 4. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 53032 (1997); see also Bd. of Trs. of 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 61419 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 8891 (2000); Coll. Sav. 
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 67275 (1999); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 64047 
(1999). 
 5. See Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political 
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND 
POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (forthcoming 
2007) (manuscript at 2 n.6, on file with the Houston Law Review), available at 
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Professor Karlan disputes that assumption. She argues that 
preclearance differs from the statutes invalidated in the City of 
Boerne decisions because it implicates five critical factorsa 
fundamental right, a suspect classification, the regulation of 
congressional elections, the need for political value judgments, 
and the exercise of political responsibility.6 Professor Karlan 
posits that these factors are all in play with respect to the 
preclearance regime, that their convergence places congressional 
power at its apogee, rendering the limits on Congress 
articulated in City of Boerne and its progeny inapplicable.7 
That is a provocative and novel defense of reauthorization. 
The standard line insists that preclearance comports with the 
City of Boerne standard, either in its most rigorous form, or 
under the less exacting version applied in two more recent 
decisions which involved suspect classes and fundamental 
rights.8 Preclearance, of course, implicates both race, a suspect 
classification, and voting, the classic fundamental right. 
Professor Karlan relies on these aspects of section 5 as important 
to its survival. But her claim is not that these specific features of 
section 5 mean that preclearance should be subject to some sort 
of watered down City of Boerne review. Far more sweeping, her 
claim is that the statute need not be subject to the City of Boerne 
analysis at all. Congress need not document pervasive, 
significant, or even any unconstitutional conduct in covered 
jurisdictions because when it acts as it did in this realm, it 
exercises what I understand Professor Karlan to suggest is a 
plenary poweror at least pretty close to one. 
Professor Karlan skillfully presents this robust vision of 
congressional power. She cogently reconciles existing precedent 
and adroitly extracts every morsel of support one can from the 
legal landscape to bolster her argument. And yet, I am not 
convinced. On both descriptive and normative grounds, I am not 
convinced that Congress enjoys, or should enjoy, as much power 
as she suggests, and, as a predictive matter, I would be surprised 
if a majority of the Roberts Court will think so either. Professor 
Karlans vision of congressional power supports not only section 5 
as reauthorized, but also a far more expansive statute, one with 
neither temporal nor geographic limitations, one unsupported by 
                                                          
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=955827. 
 6. Karlan, supra note 1, at 1719. 
 7. Id. at 17. 
 8. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 52223 (2004); Nev. Dept of Human Res. 
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003); see also Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69, 71 (2003). 
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a record of any kind, and one stripped of the bailout provision, 
the escape hatch that presently releases covered jurisdictions 
from preclearance if they comply with specified statutory criteria. 
Given the skepticism many Justices have expressed about 
various aspects of the Voting Rights Act, I suspect that a 
majority of them will not embrace such a vision. 
Still, as I have written elsewhere,9 I too think the legality of 
reauthorization should not hinge on the record of 
unconstitutional conduct the Court demanded in City of Boerne 
and its progeny. In my view, it is not the five factors that 
Professor Karlan cites that make section 5 different, but instead 
section 5s status as an operational statute, and not a wholly new 
one. The City of Boerne decisions required evidence of pervasive 
unconstitutional conduct in order to ensure that the problem 
Congress sought to address was significant enough to warrant a 
new congressional statute.10 Had Congress expanded the 
preclearance regime to apply to regions where section 5 presently 
does not operate, City of Boernes quest for pervasive 
unconstitutional conduct might govern the validity of that 
expansion. 
Reauthorization of an existing statute like section 5, 
however, requires a different showing. Section 5 was legitimately 
put in place more than forty years ago to address precisely the 
type of pervasive discrimination the City of Boerne cases require 
as justification for new legislation. For the validity of 
reauthorization to depend on evidence that such discrimination 
persists largely unchanged would mean that preclearance could 
be reauthorized only if the statute was wholly ineffective. In 
other words, section 5s very success in addressing racial 
discrimination in voting should not itself be mistaken for proof 
that preclearance has become obsolete.11 
Nor, however, should section 5s success be license for the 
statute to continue indefinitely. Instead, the validity of 
reauthorization should depend on whether section 5 has achieved 
its goals not only to suppress acts of racial discrimination in 
voting, but to bring about lasting changes in behavior and 
attitude as well. It should require that we try to predict whether 
unconstitutional conduct would resume were the constraints of 
section 5 lifted. Reauthorization should require that we 
determine whether section 5s success in controlling 
                                                          
 9. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 20). 
 10. See supra note 4. 
 11. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 2). 
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manifestations of racial discrimination now amounts to a cure for 
the underlying disease.12 
Critics of reauthorization insist that we have been cured. 
Observed improvements in minority political participation 
suggest that may be right, but these improvements are also, as 
Professor Karlan rightly notes, consistent with the view that 
section 5 is curbing misconduct that might otherwise find 
expression.13 Professor Karlan argues for plenary power in part 
because she believes the evidence on the ground supports both a 
realist account and the more optimistic story critics of 
reauthorization celebrate. Because Congress opted for realism, 
she argues, the Court should not displace it.14 
I am nevertheless wary of an approach that renders 
reauthorization functionally unreviewable. City of Boerne and its 
progeny, while problematic in important respects, were 
nevertheless properly animated by the conviction that 
congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction 
Amendmentsincluding Congresss power to reauthorize section 
5is not wholly unfettered. The Roberts Court will undoubtedly 
assess reauthorization under the City of Boerne standard, 
requiring congruence and proportionality between the statutory 
provision and the injury addressed, and indeed it should. My 
view, however, is that when it does, it must adjust the City of 
Boerne standard to reflect section 5s status as an operational 
statute. 
More specifically, the validity of section 5 cannot hinge on 
the scope of contemporary unconstitutional conduct in covered 
jurisdictions, given that section 5 presently operates to block 
such conduct.15 Instead, reauthorization is best understood to 
target political processes that continue to be compromised by 
race, compromised in ways that reflect past unconstitutional 
conduct and portend future misconduct absent the strictures of 
section 5. As I will explain, such practices are a legitimate target 
for congressional enforcement legislation. The Court has 
specifically so held in the past and explicitly affirmed in City of 
Boerne itself.16 
                                                          
 12. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 31; see also Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 21) 
(questioning whether Section 5 has successfully achieved its larger ambition not simply 
to suppress discrimination in voting but to change the attitudes that, if left unchecked, 
give rise to the behavior). 
 13. Karlan, supra note 1, at 2122. 
 14. Id. at 30. 
 15. See id. at 22. 
 16. See infra notes 3133 and accompanying text.  
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To be sure, understanding reauthorization to target political 
processes of this sort presents a serious problem if congressional 
power is to remain at all circumscribed. Race will very likely 
always affect political processes in problematic ways and the 
prospect of future misconduct will never fully abate. How then 
should we gauge Congresss determination that preclearance 
remains necessary in covered jurisdictions at this moment 
without unavoidably upholding congressional power to deem it 
necessary in perpetuity, to expand its reach geographically or to 
heighten the burdens it imposes? 
The best answer has been provided by Congress itself. In the 
reauthorized statute, Congress articulated a standard to gauge 
when preclearance is no longer necessary.17 That standard, set 
forth in the statutes bailout provision, does not require the 
elimination of every way race compromises political processes in 
covered jurisdictions. Nor does it demand the elimination of any 
threat of future misconduct. Instead, it articulates criteria 
compliance with which Congress has deemed proof the 
jurisdiction has made sufficient progress to be relieved of further 
obligations under section 5.18 
While Congress designed the bailout criteria for application 
on a case-by-case basis, it implicitly applied the standard 
wholesale when it recently reauthorized section 5. 
Reauthorization reflects Congresss judgment that preclearance 
remains necessary and, by implication, that covered jurisdictions 
were not categorically qualified for bailout at the time of renewal. 
The record evidence Congress collected prior to reauthorization 
indeed suggests widespread noncompliance with the bailout 
factors.19 
Congress nevertheless left room for the possibility that 
covered jurisdictions might demonstrate otherwise and show that 
they made sufficient progress to be released from coverage, now 
or in the coming years. In other words, the bailout provision 
enables covered jurisdictions to calibrate on an individual basis 
Congresss judgment that, overall, section 5 remains necessary. 
Bailout thereby clarifies the regime reauthorization imposes. 
Rather than an inexorable command, preclearance operates as a 
rebuttable presumption that covered jurisdictions may refute. 
The question of whether to reauthorize preclearance forced 
Congress to confront a difficult counterfactual: what would 
                                                          
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F) (2000). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See S. Res. 232, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S9541 (2005).  
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happen if the strictures of section 5 were lifted? Sufficient 
evidence pointed to the conclusion that some ill would occur, but 
how much or how pervasive this occurrence would be was 
difficult to assess. Faced with this uncertainty, Congress 
renewed the statute but limited its reach by specifying 
evidentiary criteria that a jurisdiction must satisfy to 
demonstrate that it had sufficiently mended its ways, and it left 
the burden on the jurisdiction to so demonstrate. In the context 
of renewing an existing statute in the face of necessary 
uncertainty, this choice, as exercised by Congress, should receive 
deference under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. And it 
is ultimately this choice that renders reauthorization 
constitutional. 
* * * 
Part I of this Essay parses the factors Professor Karlan 
identifies as characterizing the preclearance regime, which she 
claims give rise to distinct congressional power in this realm. 
This Part explains why the Roberts Court is likely to read each of 
these factors less expansively than does Professor Karlan. Part II 
offers an alternative approach through which to explore validity 
of reauthorization, one that requires adapting the City of Boerne 
framework to accommodate section 5s status as an operational 
statute. Part III concludes this commentary. 
II. A PLENARY POWER? 
Professor Karlan argues that the preclearance process is 
different from the statutes invalidated in the City of Boerne line 
of cases in several critical ways, which, when taken together, 
placed Congresss power at its apogee when it reauthorized 
section 5.20 The Roberts Court may well disagree. Here is why. 
A. Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications 
Professor Karlan observes that Congresss power to enforce 
the Reconstruction Amendments is at its strongest when it 
acts to remedy or prevent the kinds of practices that the Court 
has subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny.21 Congress can do 
more, she writes, when it acts to protect a fundamental right or 
suspect classification than when it seeks to promote equality 
more generally.22 
                                                          
 20. Karlan, supra note 1, at 17. 
 21. Id. at 13. 
 22. Id. 
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This position has been widely advanced in the debates that 
preceded reauthorization, and the authority most often cited for 
it is the authority Professor Karlan invokesnamely, two recent 
decisions, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, and 
Tennessee v. Lane.23 Hibbs sustained the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) against a Boerne-based challenge, while Lane 
upheld a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
facing a similar attack. Hibbs emphasized that the FMLA 
implicated questions of gender discrimination, a subject that 
receives heightened judicial scrutiny,24 while Lane pointed out 
that the application of the ADA under challenge had protected 
access to the courts, and thus implicated a fundamental right.25 
Supporters of reauthorization celebrate Hibbs and Lane, but 
whether the Roberts Court will embrace these decisions remains 
to be seen. Hibbs and Lane are not easily reconciled with the 
earlier City of Boerne decisions, some of which involved 
challenges to statutes that also implicated fundamental rights 
(such as the free exercise of religion in City of Boerne itself) or a 
suspect classification (such as gender discrimination in the 
United States v. Morrison26 decision striking down the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA)). These earlier decisions elicited no 
deference from the Court of the sort the Justices employed in 
Hibbs and Lane. While the statutes in these earlier cases might 
be distinguished from the FMLA and ADA in terms of their 
relative breadth and the type of remedy imposed, the earlier 
decisions never suggested that suspect classes or fundamental 
rights might matter to the analysis. 
Both Hibbs and Lane, moreover, involved fractured opinions, 
and the deciding votes were cast by Justices no longer on the 
Court (namely, William Rehnquist in Hibbs and Sandra Day 
OConnor in Lane).27 Justice Kennedy, who now holds the Courts 
center, dissented in both cases.28 Thus, even if a majority of the 
Rehnquist Court believed that more deference to Congress should 
be accorded when legislation implicates fundamental rights and 
suspect classifications, a majority of the Roberts Court may not. 
Professor Karlan may yet find herself longing for the good old 
days of the Rehnquist Court. 
                                                          
 23. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 52223 (2004); Nev. Dept of Human Res. v. 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 72829 (2003). 
 24. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728. 
 25. Lane, 541 U.S. at 52122. 
 26. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 27. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723; Lane, 541 U.S. at 512. 
 28. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723; Lane, 541 U.S. at 512. 
(2)KATZ.DOC 3/20/2007 4:08 PM 
2007] RESPONSE TO KARLAN 41 
Even if Hibbs and Lane remain good law, the decisions do 
not suggest a power plenary in scope. While they uphold 
congressional enactments based on thinner records than those 
deemed inadequate in the original City of Boerne decisions, they 
hardly repudiate the City of Boerne framework. 29 They continue 
to emphasize the extent and specificity of the unconstitutional 
state conduct needed as a predicate for congressional action.30 
Even absent this precedent, the Courts careful preservation 
of the VRAs preclearance regime in prior decisions does indeed 
suggest special receptivity to congressional power over suspect 
classifications and fundamental rights, and specifically to the 
very classification and fundamental right preclearance 
implicates.31 City of Boerne cites earlier versions of the VRAs 
section 5 as the paradigm of permissible enforcement legislation, 
despite both the burden those measures placed on the States and 
their proscription of constitutional conduct.32 City of Boernes 
progeny likewise invoke the earlier VRA provisions as examples of 
permissible congressional action and cite the decisions upholding 
them as so establishing.33 
                                                          
 29. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Real Discrimination?, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 97, 
118 (2004) (Together Lane and Hibbs establish that Congress has more authority to act 
under Section 5 . . . when it is dealing with claims of discrimination or violations of rights 
which receive heightened scrutiny.). But see Vikram David Amar, The New New 
Federalism: The Supreme Court in Hibbs (and Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2d 349, 35153 
(2003) (arguing that the heightened scrutiny for gender classifications notwithstanding, 
Hibbs is irreconcilable with City of Boerne and Morrison). 
 30. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 73335 & n.11; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 52829 (noting the 
sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional 
discrimination evidenced through judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and 
statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons with 
disabilities from the enjoyment of public services). 
 31. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (contrasting 
abrogation of immunity in ADA with the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 62627 (2000) (contrasting VAWA 
with statutory provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. 
Morgan); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 8889 (2000) (discussing the 
importance of the legislative record); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 63839 & n.5 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
518 (1997) (citing VRA quartet as examples of permissible enforcement legislation); see 
also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (likening congressional efforts to combat sex discrimination in 
the FMLA with the VRAs attempt to combat racial discrimination in voting, as upheld in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach). The notable exception is City of Boernes rejection of 
Katzenbach v. Morgans suggestion that Congress may expand the rights protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 52728. 
 32. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. 
 33. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (citing the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach as examples of permissible congressional measures to address a serious 
problem); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 (stating that [t]he ADAs constitutional shortcomings 
are apparent when compared with the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (describing VAWA as unlike the remedies 
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The Courts post-Boerne decision, Lopez v. Monterey County, 
vigorously affirmed the constitutionality of a broad construction 
of section 5.34 In Lopez, Justice OConnors majority opinion easily 
finds that Congress has the constitutional authority to designate 
covered jurisdictions and to guard against changes that give rise 
to a discriminatory effect in those jurisdictions.35 This process 
may be intrusive,36 but it falls well within Congresss enforcement 
powers to mandate. [T]he Voting Rights Act, by its nature, 
intrudes on state sovereignty, Justice OConnor observed, while 
emphasizing that [t]he Fifteenth Amendment permits this 
intrusion.37 Lopez thereby affirms as constitutionally permissible 
the burden that the section 5 preclearance process by its nature 
places on state sovereignty.38 
While the Court had previously upheld congressional 
authority to enact section 5,39 Lopez is important because it 
addressed the constitutionality of the statute after the 1982 
extension and after the emergence of the City of Boerne 
framework.40 Lopez certainly offers support for the claim that 
section 5 is entitled to a different form of review than that 
employed in the City of Boerne cases. In Lopez, Justice OConnor 
cites City of Boerne only once, and then solely for the proposition 
that Congresss enforcement power includes the power to prohibit 
constitutional conduct and to intrude deeply into state sovereign 
                                                          
upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 
89 (contrasting the congressional record supporting ADEAs abrogation of state immunity 
with that underlying the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach); Fla. 
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 63839 & n.5 (invoking City of Boernes discussion of the VRA 
quartet to distinguish the statutory provision in dispute). 
 34. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 28285 (1999); see also John Matthew 
Guard, Comment, Impotent Figureheads? State Sovereignty, Federalism, and the 
Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Lopez v. Monterey County and 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329, 35556 (1999). 
 35. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283. 
 36. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Dont Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial 
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 790 (1998) (describing preclearance process 
as an unprecedented federal intrusion into the governing processes of the states). 
 37. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 28485. 
 38. Id. at 284. Lopez, in fact, references not just section 5 but the Voting Rights Act 
in its entirety. Id. 
 39. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); see also Guard, supra note 34, at 357 (arguing that 
principles of stare decisis support the Courts holding in Lopez). 
 40. Lopez was decided during the same term as the College Savings Bank and 
Florida Prepaid decisions, both of which developed and extended the City of Boerne 
decision. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 672 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 63740 (1999). 
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processes.41 Lopez, moreover, makes no mention of the 
congressional findings underlying the 1982 extension of section 5. 
Instead, Justice OConnor affirms the validity of section 5 based 
on South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome v. United 
States, both of which upheld earlier versions of the statute based 
on distinct legislative findings and historic circumstances.42 
The Justices in Lopez were remarkably united in thinking 
section 5 legitimate. Justice OConnors opinion was joined not 
only by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of 
whom dissented in City of Boernes progeny,43 but also by Justice 
Scalia, who voted with the majority in all of the City of Boerne 
decisions and dissented in both Hibbs and Lane.44 So too, while 
former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy concurred 
in Lopez, they did so to dispute a factual issue and a specific 
application of section 5, and not to question the overall validity of 
the statute.45 Even Justice Thomas, who dissented alone and 
argued that the Courts construction of section 5 contravened the 
City of Boerne standard,46 did not suggest that section 5 itself, as 
amended in 1982, was suspect under the City of Boerne doctrine. 
Lopezs affirmation of section 5 was not, accordingly, the product 
of a divided Court. 
The Roberts Court also appears to subscribe to the 
proposition that section 5 is legally permissible, at least insofar 
                                                          
 41. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 28283 (As the Court recently observed with respect to 
Congresss power to legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment, [l]egislation which 
deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congresss 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to 
the States. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)) (alteration in 
original). 
 42. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 28284; see also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 18082 
(discussing congressional findings supporting the 1975 extension of the Act and agreeing 
that the need for the extension was unsurprising and unassailable and that it was 
plainly a constitutional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment); South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 30809 (noting extensive congressional findings underlying the 
1965 VRA). 
 43. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 693 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 44. Justice OConnor likewise joined the majority in City of Boernes progeny, but 
dissented in City of Boerne itself because of her disagreement with the Courts analysis in 
Employment Division v. Smith. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 54445 (OConnor, J., 
dissenting).  
 45. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 46. See id. at 29596 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that nondiscretionary actions 
cannot be motivated by unconstitutional conduct and accordingly that Congress cannot reach 
them through enforcement legislation). 
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as it was reauthorized in 1982. In last years League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, Justice Scalia 
characterized the states interest in complying with section 5 as 
compelling. Justice Scalia stated that this compelling interest 
justified, under strict scrutiny, what he deemed to be an 
intentional racial gerrymander.47 Joining Justice Scalia on this 
point were Justices Thomas and Alito, and Chief Justice 
Roberts.48 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer had all 
previously stated their belief that compliance with section 5, as 
amended in 1982, is a compelling state interest.49 As a result, 
Justice Kennedy is now the only sitting Justice who has not 
expressly subscribed to that proposition. 
All told, these decisions provide substantial support for the 
proposition that Congress has additional power when it regulates 
at least one suspect classification and at least one fundamental 
right. That is, these decisions suggest that congressional power 
to regulate the intersection of race and the right to vote is simply 
different. I have written elsewhere that such a rule makes sense, 
and in fact comports with a meaningful commitment to 
federalism and state power. In particular, I think that the Court 
has historically deferred to congressional power in the realm of 
race and the vote in order to reinforce representative governance 
at the state and local level. The animating conviction is that state 
and local governments best protect individual liberty, but this 
conviction is informed by the belief that to do their jobs such 
governments must be democratically accountable. Seen in this 
light, intrusive federal measures like section 5 are permissible 
because they are thought to foster effective state and local 
                                                          
 47. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 
266667 (2006); see also Nathaniel Persily, Strict in Theory, Loopy in Fact, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 43 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/ 
vol105/persily.pdf. 
 48. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2663.  
 49. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996). (We assume, arguendo, for the purpose 
of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2 could be a compelling interest . . . .); see 
also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion) ([W]e assume without 
deciding that compliance with the [section 2] results test . . . can be a compelling state 
interest); id. at 99092 (OConnor, J., concurring) (stating that compliance with the 
results test of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest); id. at 
1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that [e]ven if strict scrutiny applies, I would find 
these districts constitutional, for each considers race only to the extent necessary to 
comply with the States responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act while achieving other 
race-neutral political and geographical requirements); id. at 1046 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(describing as significant Justice OConnors concurring position that compliance with § 2 
of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest). 
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governance and thereby to render unnecessary even more 
intrusive and extensive federal regulation.50 
This suggests that the Court might well think that section 5, 
as reauthorized in 2006, is no different from the earlier versions 
of the statute. The Court might review it with the same 
deferential stance the Justices employed previously. Still, the 
Court may think the most recent reauthorization presents a 
distinct issue. In the City of Boerne decisions the Court had little 
difficulty affirming the validity of section 5, a historically 
resonant statute that was not subject to direct challenge.51 So too, 
Lopez involved a relatively narrow question of statutory 
interpretation, not a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
statute.52 Lopez was decided just two years after the City of Boerne 
decision, at a time when the Court might not yet have appreciated 
the breadth of the City of Boerne doctrine, notwithstanding Justice 
Thomass prescient warning in dissent.53 Likewise, LULAC 
prompted Justice Scalias embrace of section 5, but did not involve 
a direct challenge to the statute, something Justice Scalia was 
careful to note along with the fact that he was assuming and not 
deciding the statutes constitutionality.54 
Most importantly, all the decisions from City of Boerne to 
Lopez to LULAC addressed section 5 when expiration of the 
statute loomed on the horizon. Indeed, Justice Scalias decision in 
LULAC deemed compliance with section 5 a compelling state 
interest at a moment when the Court was likely never again to 
confront a challenge under this version of the statute. The 
inclination to affirm the validity of a statute that is about to 
expire may say little about ones willingness to uphold section 5, 
as recently reauthorized, for another quarter century, 
particularly when the conditions that first prompted enactment 
of this temporary statute occurred four decades ago. 
                                                          
 50. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 2341, 2388 (2003). 
 51. Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative 
Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1594 (2002) (describing 
the VRA as the crown jewel of the Second Reconstruction and suggesting that the 
Court has been unwilling to use strict scrutiny to dismantle [it]). 
 52. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at *8, Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 
(1999) (No. 97-1396); Brief for Appellee Monterey County at *23, Lopez v. Monterey 
County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (No. 97-1396); Brief for State Appellee at *1011, Lopez v. 
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (No. 97-1396).  
 53. See Katz, supra note 50, at 2373. 
 54. LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2668 n.2 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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B. The Regulation of Congressional Elections 
Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes state 
legislatures to regulate congressional elections, while specifying 
that Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations.55 For Professor Karlan, this grant of authority 
reinforc[es] the validity of section 5.56 While the preclearance 
regime is typically understood as an exercise of congressional 
power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,57 
Professor Karlan argues that Congress also exercised its power 
under the Elections Clause when it reauthorized section 5, at 
least insofar as the preclearance process regulates elections in 
which members of Congress are selected.58 
This is both correct and important because, as Professor 
Karlan notes, precedent suggests that congressional power under 
the Elections Clause is quite broad. Professor Karlan reads this 
precedent as establishing that Article I grants Congress 
essentially plenary authority59 when it regulates congressional 
elections, and that may well be right. If so, the grant of authority 
provides sufficient congressional power to support many 
applications of section 5. It allows for the continued application of 
the preclearance process to voting changes that pertain to 
congressional elections, including changes related to so-called 
mixed elections, namely elections involving multiple offices so 
long as candidates for Congress are among them.60 
And yet, it does not reach purely local elections,61 the very 
elections where section 5 appears to be most important. 
Discriminatory practices remain more persistent at the local 
level where party affiliation less effectively operates as a 
mitigating factor.62 Indeed, the Department of Justice has 
                                                          
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 56. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 4. 
 57. Id. at 1011. 
 58. Id. at 17; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the 
New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 4, on file with 
the Houston Law Review) (arguing that the Elections Clause provides an alternative 
theory on which the reauthorization might be upheld). 
 59. Karlan, supra note 1, at 16. 
 60. Id. at 17 (citing In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888)). 
 61. Tokaji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 26).  
 62. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 4) (noting that with regard to section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, successful challenges to local practices exceed the number of such 
challenges to statewide ones); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Essay, Is Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1724 (2004) 
(arguing that preclearance is no longer warranted for statewide districting plans). 
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objected more often to changes proposed at the local level than to 
statewide changes such as congressional redistricting plans.63 
The Elections Clause consequently provides significant, but 
ultimately only partial, support for the validity of 
reauthorization. 
C. Political Value Judgments 
Reasonable people disagree about how to achieve what 
Professor Karlan labels political fairness in the electoral 
process.64 Elections might be structured in a number of legitimate 
ways, and the Constitution provides little guidance on how to 
select among them. Regulating the political process necessarily 
requires that choices be made among what Professor Karlan calls 
hotly contested principles of political philosophy, choices that 
she maintains are ill-suited for judicial resolution.65 Because 
Professor Karlan thinks these choices are particularly within 
the expertise of politicians,66 she argues that courts should defer 
to legislatures and, specifically, that Congress should . . . have 
more leeway to make initial choices.67 
Professor Karlan posits that reauthorization represents such 
a choice. Section 5, she argues, involves the regulation of the 
political process and embodies numerous political value 
judgments that the Court lacks the ability to make. Congress 
made the judgments, and Professor Karlan posits that the Court 
should not displace them.68 
Professor Karlan highlights one specific value judgment, 
namely what is known as the Georgia v. Ashcroft fix. Georgia v. 
Ashcroft held that Georgia could permissibly replace some 
majority-minority districts with so-called coalition and 
influence districts,69 and that covered jurisdictions have the 
                                                          
 63. See Michael J. Pitts, Lets Not Call the Whole Thing off Just Yet: A Response to 
Samuel Issacharoffs Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. 
REV. 605, 612 (2005) (arguing that the greatest impact of section 5 and the VRA has been 
to police voting discrimination at the local level). 
 64. Karlan, supra note 1, at 1819. 
 65. Id. at 18. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 19. 
 68. Id. at 17.  
 69. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? 
Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1539 & n.60 (2002) 
(defining and discussing coalition districts). In coalition districts, black voters need not 
comprise the majority of a districts population to be able to elect representatives of 
choice, while influence districts permit minority voters to exert some sway in the electoral 
process but not necessarily elect representatives of choice. Id. at 153940. 
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discretion to select among these districting devices.70 As the 
Court wrote, Section 5 gives States the flexibility to choose one 
theory of effective representation over the other.71 
Congress fixed Georgia v. Ashcroft when it reauthorized 
section 5 by expressing its preference for one specific theory of 
representation. The reauthorized statute provides that a change 
that will have the effect of diminishing the ability of minority 
voters to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or 
abridges the right to vote for purposes of section 5 review.72 In 
other words, the amendment prevents Georgia from doing what 
the Court said Georgia could do in Georgia v. Ashcroft, namely, 
replace majority-minority districts, where minority voters elect 
representatives of choice, with influence districts, where, by 
definition, they do not. 
Professor Karlan has argued that minority voters are better 
served when they elect representatives of choice than when they 
are only able to influence outcomes.73 That is, she prefers the 
theory of representation Congress adopted in the reauthorized 
statute better than the one Georgia implemented, but her 
argument doesnt depend on this preference. Instead, her claim is 
that Congress made a choice among differing theories, and that it 
has the constitutional power to do so. 
I wonder. The Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft certainly claimed 
it was agnostic about the theories of representation at issue in 
the case and that it read section 5 as allowing states to choose 
among them.74 Still, I cant help but think that the Justices sided 
with Georgia because they preferred the substantive choice 
Georgia made. That is, the Justices upheld Georgias discretion 
to replace majority-minority districts with influence districts 
because the Justices think that latter form of representation is 
better policy. Several Justices have expressly said so,75 and some 
                                                          
 70.  See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (noting that, as between 
majority-minority and coalition districts, [s]ection 5 does not dictate that a State must 
pick one of these methods of redistricting over another); id. at 483 (finding that [s]ection 
5 leaves room for States to use these types of influence and coalitional districts . . . . [and 
that] the States choice ultimately may rest on a political choice of whether substantive or 
descriptive representation is preferable). 
 71. Id. at 482. 
 72. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 
58081 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c). 
 73. See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of 
Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 3132 (2004). 
 74. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 48082. 
 75. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) ([E]qual opportunity to 
gain public office regardless of race . . . is neither assured nor well served . . . by carving 
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have suggested that majority-minority districts themselves may 
be unlawful.76 Indeed, language in Georgia v. Ashcroft itself 
reflects the Courts continuing discomfort with the majority-
minority district as a form of representation.77 
If thats right, the Courts willingness to uphold Georgias 
decision to replace majority-minority districts with influence 
districts doesnt necessarily mean that the Justices would have 
sustained a decision to move in the opposite direction. It does not 
mean that the Court will necessarily agree that Congress has the 
discretion to select the specific theory of representation that it 
did when it attempted the Georgia v. Ashcroft fix. 
But even if the Court finds that congressional power to make 
political value judgments is sufficient to sustain this statutory 
amendment, will it think such power supports the preclearance 
regime more generally? Reauthorization does not simply block 
covered jurisdictions from reducing the number of majority-
minority districts in the manner that Georgia did. Instead, it 
retains the entire preclearance apparatus and continues section 
5s burden-shifting process under which the presumption of 
validity that typically attaches to state and local decisionmaking 
is reversed. 
In one sense, of course, Congresss decision to continue this 
regime reflects a political value judgmentthe judgment that 
                                                          
electorates into racial blocs.); id. at 91112 (When the State assigns voters on the basis 
of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular 
race, because of their race, think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer 
the same candidates at the polls. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993))); 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (recognizing that majority-minority 
districts may sometimes be necessary to ensure equal political and electoral 
opportunity, but emphasizing that such districts embody the politics of second best, 
and should be avoided whenever diverse ethnic and racial coalitions are possible); Holder 
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892, 892907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that 
majority-minority districts represent racial balkanization of the Nation, that they 
segregat[e] the races into political homelands that amount[], in truth, to nothing short of 
a system of political apartheid, that they give credence to the view that race defines 
political interest, and that few devices could be better designed to exacerbate racial 
tensions than the consciously segregated districting system currently being constructed in 
the name of the Voting Rights Act (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647, 657)); see also Richard 
H. Pildes, Diffusion of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POLY 119, 121 (2000) (describing the position that self-conscious creation of majority-
minority districts expresses a view of political identity inconsistent with democratic 
ideals . . . . [and] might have the consequentialist effect of encouraging citizens and 
representatives increasingly to come to experience and define their political identities and 
interests in partial terms). 
 76. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 801 (stating that a majority of the 
majority [in the Shaw cases] regards the intentional creation of [a majority-minority 
district] as presumptively unconstitutional but that a majority of the full Court does not). 
 77. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 487. But see LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 
2616, 2622 (2006). 
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the procedures the regime mandates remain necessary. Still, it 
strikes me as a value judgment of a different order than the 
specific substantive choice Congress made in response to Georgia 
v. Ashcroft. If preclearance in its entirety constitutes a political 
value judgment to which the Court should defer, the 
expansiveness of the category strips it of analytic power. No 
longer a reason to defer to congressional power, the need for a 
political value judgment constitutes nothing more than the 
conclusion that deference is required. In this light, the factor 
simply restates the general claim that power here should be 
plenary without advancing the case for why it might be. 
D. Exercising Political Responsibility 
The final component of Professor Karlans argument rests on 
her characterization of the preclearance regime as a 
quintessential exercise of political responsibility.78 This matters, 
Professor Karlan suggests, because she maintains that the 
animating force within much of the City of Boerne doctrine and 
the Courts federalism jurisprudence generally is the belief that 
the federal government should own up to measures that erode 
state sovereignty and not a broader concern for protecting state 
sovereignty itself.79 Because Professor Karlan believes that 
preclearance manifests the requisite federal assumption of 
political responsibility, she argues the federalism decisions do not 
affect the validity of reauthorization. 
Thats a provocative and interesting claim, but again, Im not 
convinced that the Court will agree nor that it should. To be sure, 
the Court has made clear that the concerns propelling its 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence are not implicated when 
Congress authorizes the federal government (as opposed to a 
private party) to initiate litigation against a state defendant.80 It 
has also suggested (albeit less explicitly) that these concerns 
were at issue in many of the City of Boerne decisions, which 
involved congressional efforts to abrogate state immunity from 
suit under the Fourteenth Amendment.81 Finally, the Court has 
indeed flatly rejected federal measures that blur lines of political 
                                                          
 78. Karlan, supra note 1, at 19. 
 79. Id. at 11. 
 80. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 75556 (1999).  
 81. In decisions like Kimel, Florida Prepaid, and Garrett, the Court refused to allow 
Congress to circumvent decisions like Seminole Tribe of Florida through an expansive use 
of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62, 67 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 630 (1999); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
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responsibility and emphasized the need for the federal 
government to assume responsibility for the measures it 
initiates.82 
Far less clear is whether any of this informs the validity of 
the section 5 preclearance regime. The assumption of political 
responsibility as described by Professor Karlan is hardly a 
necessary condition for a statutes survival.83 That it might be 
sufficient (or at least sufficient when combined with independent 
factors of the sort Professor Karlan lists) is, I suppose, possible. 
Its also possible that the Court believes that the need to assume 
political responsibility is but one value that inheres in its vast 
federalism jurisprudence. Congress may well circumvent the 
rules applying the Eleventh Amendment by assuming political 
responsibility for the measures it promotes. But that power does 
not necessarily mean it can get around all the strictures 
embodied in federalism case law simply by assuming such 
responsibility. In other words, additional values limit 
congressional power in this realm. 
Nor is it clear to me that preclearance reflects an 
assumption of responsibility of the sort or scope Professor Karlan 
suggests. She is, of course, correct that judicial preclearance (that 
is, when states seek preclearance in federal district court) raises 
none of the specific concerns that the abrogation cases involve, 
since it does not implicate the Eleventh Amendment.84 The State 
is by definition the plaintiff, and thus is not being subjected to 
suit. As important, the Attorney Generals response as a 
defendant in such suits necessarily manifests an exercise of 
responsibility, either by rebutting the claims made by the 
covered jurisdiction or by acquiescing to them.85 
So too, political responsibility is plausibly exercised within 
the administrative preclearance process where the vast majority 
of preclearance requests are submitted.86 The Attorney General 
assumes such responsibility when he interposes an objection to a 
                                                          
 82. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
 83. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004) (upholding the FMLAs 
authorization of private suits against state agencies); Nev. Dept of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (upholding ADAs authorization of private suits against state 
agencies). 
 84. Karlan, supra note 1, at 19. 
 85. See id. at 20. 
 86. See Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 52, 53 n.2 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson 
eds., 1992) (citing Justice Department statistics); Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 191 (1983) (citing the expense 
and delay involved in a declaratory judgment action as primary reasons most 
jurisdictions seek preclearance from the Attorney General). 
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proposed change, and other agency actors at least arguably do so 
as well when they take actions that slow state decision-making or 
indeed functionally block choices a State would otherwise make.87 
And yet, section 5 imposes its biggest burden by requiring 
covered jurisdictions to submit changes for preclearance 
(regardless of how the Department of Justice responds to 
submissions). It is this obligation that is far more difficult to 
characterize as an exercise of political responsibility of the sort 
Professor Karlan references. To be sure, through the original 
coverage formulas set forth in the VRA and the reauthorizations 
that followed, Congress decided that covered jurisdictions should 
bear the burden to submit electoral changes, regardless of their 
individual merits, and defend their legitimacy. But if Congresss 
determination that preclearance was needed and remains 
necessary represents an exercise of political responsibility, then 
any legislative act would presumably qualify as well. 
That hardly renders reauthorization suspect. It simply 
means that the exercise of responsibility the statute reflects does 
not ensure its survival. 
III. A THIRD APPROACH 
Most proponents of preclearance parse the congressional 
record for documented evidence of misconduct in covered 
jurisdictions and defend section 5 as a congruent and 
proportional remedy under the City of Boerne standard, 
understood either in its most rigorous form or under the less 
exacting approach set forth in Hibbs and Lane.88 Professor 
Karlan, by contrast, posits a vision of congressional power that 
allows Congress to renew preclearance regardless of whether the 
new statute comports with the cramped standards set forth in 
City of Boerne and its progeny. 
In this part, I suggest a third approach to assess the validity 
of reauthorization. I do not believe the scope of unconstitutional 
conduct in covered jurisdictions can help us gauge the need for 
renewal, given that section 5 presently operates to block such 
conduct.89 And yet, I dont think Congress enjoys so much power 
that its decision to renew preclearance becomes functionally 
                                                          
 87. See, e.g., Luis Ricardo Fraga & Maria Lizet Ocampo, The Deterrent Effect of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Role of More Information Requests, in DEMOCRACY, 
PARTICIPATION AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 8, on file with the Houston Law Review), available at 
http://www.ucdc.edu/faculty/Voting_Rights/Papers/5%20-%20Fraga%20&%20Ocampo.pdf. 
 88. See supra notes 8, 2325 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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unreviewable. The City of Boerne cases have been widely 
criticized,90 but they nevertheless rest on the important intuition 
that congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction 
Amendments is not wholly unbounded. My view is that this 
intuition applies to reauthorization as well, both as a normative 
matter and as a predictive judgment of what the Court will do. 
A. Reauthorizing Existing Statutes Under City of Boerne 
The City of Boerne decisions articulate ways to limit 
Congresss enforcement powers, with the need for a supporting 
record of unconstitutional conduct being the most prominent. The 
need for such a record, however, makes little sense when 
evaluating an operational statute such as section 5. After all, 
such a requirement would allow Congress to reauthorize the 
preclearance regime only if it were an utterly unsuccessful means 
to combat discrimination. 
But if the scope of unconstitutional conduct cannot help us 
evaluate Congresss determination that preclearance remains 
necessary, how can we assess Congresss judgment that the world 
has yet to change so much that section 5 might be eliminated 
without serious adverse consequence? 
My view is that the City of Boerne standard of review 
remains applicable to reauthorizationthat is, the reauthorized 
statute must exhibit congruence and proportionality between 
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end91but that application of this standard must be 
adjusted to reflect the status of section 5 as an operational 
statute. Reauthorization should not be seen to address 
contemporary unconstitutional conduct of debatable scope. 
Instead, reauthorization should be understood to target political 
processes that continue to be compromised by race, compromised 
in ways that reflect past misconduct and that portend future 
misconduct absent the statutes renewal. In my view, Congress 
may legitimately target political processes compromised in this 
manner, and may do so through the means it selected when it 
renewed section 5, namely, with a remedial regime that is 
intrusive but also circumscribed in critical respects. 
                                                          
 90. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a 
Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 60204 (1998); Ruth 
Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
783, 79193 (2002); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Equal Protection by Law: 
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 455 
(2000).  
 91. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
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More specifically, racial considerations may compromise a 
political process in ways that do not rise to a constitutional 
violation. Voting may be polarized along racial lines and 
campaigns marked by racial appeals. Historic discrimination 
both in voting and other realms may hinder contemporary 
political participation, quantitatively in terms of voter 
registration and turnout, and more qualitatively, by, for instance, 
hindering cross-racial alliances and fundraising efforts, 
particularly in environments that are racially segregated.92 
Elected officials may be nonresponsive to minority residents, and 
minority candidates may have little hope of mounting a 
successful campaign.93 
None of this, of course, necessarily matters under 
conventional City of Boerne analysis, which cares little about 
behavior that does not rise to the level of unconstitutional 
conduct. In my view, however, such evidence critically informs 
the validity of reauthorization. It reveals an environment in 
which race remains salient in problematic ways, ways that 
compromise rather than foster the emergence of a truly healthy 
and vibrant political community. It signals that the vestiges of 
past discrimination have not been adequately remedied and it 
portends future discrimination stemming from contemporary 
limits on full participation. In short, it describes an environment 
in which federal measures protecting voting rights remain 
justified. 
The Supreme Court has so recognized, or, more precisely, 
affirmed Congresss power to make this determination in a series 
of decisions dating back to Reconstruction.94 The modern 
articulation of the principle is found in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
which upheld the ban on literacy tests set forth in section 4(e) of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, because such tests excluded 
members of New York Citys Puerto Rican community from 
casting a ballot.95 The concern was both that the tests themselves 
were the product of prohibited discrimination and that the use of 
such tests fostered discrimination in governmental services.96 
Morgan recognizes congressional power to ban this literacy test 
both as a remedy for past discrimination and also to protect the 
                                                          
 92. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 23). 
 93. See id. 
 94. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 66162 (1884) (recognizing 
Congresss power to protect voting interests in the famous Ku Klux cases); see also Katz, 
supra note 50, at 2343. 
 95. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 64647 (1966). 
 96. Id. at 653. 
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people the test excluded from future governmental 
discrimination.97 Morgan posits that people denied access to the 
franchise are more likely to confront such discrimination, and 
accordingly upholds congressional power to enact section 4(e) 
because doing so enhanced political power [that] will be helpful 
in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the 
entire Puerto Rican community.98 
City of Boerne, of course, rejected the most famous 
proposition associated with Morgan, specifically, the suggestion 
that Congress may enact legislation that expands rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.99 City of Boerne, 
however, assiduously affirmed the two core rationales for 
Morgans holding, namely, congressional power to ban New 
Yorks English literacy test as a remedial measure for official 
discrimination in establishing voter qualification,100 and 
congressional power to ban the test as a mechanism to address 
future discrimination in public services.101 
Thats all well and good as far as it goes. But a problem 
remains if the Court wants to use this framework to uphold 
reauthorization as both a remedial measure and a measure to 
block future discrimination. Congressional power, as described in 
Morgan and affirmed in City of Boerne, is functionally 
unbounded. A truly healthy political community, one where race 
unites us only in positive ways, is something we are unlikely to 
witness in our lifetimes. Vestiges of discrimination persist, and 
will very likely always persist. We will continually be able to 
collect evidence showing the ways race affects the political 
process in problematic ways, and we can be sure that the threat 
of future misconduct will never fully abate. 
If that admittedly gloomy prediction is right, how does it 
inform the validity of reauthorization? To what extent can 
Congress address the vestiges of past discrimination and block 
future misconduct and still exercise a power of circumscribed 
dimension? Put differently, how will we know when enough is 
enough? 
                                                          
 97. Id. at 65356. 
 98. Id. at 652. 
 99. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 52728 (1997) (noting language in 
Morgan that could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact 
legislation that expands the rights contained in [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and finding that [a]ny suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-
remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law). 
 100. See id. at 528; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654. 
 101. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528; see also Katz, supra note 50, at 239596. 
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That is a tough question, but one about which we need not 
speculate in a vacuum. The statute as reauthorized includes 
within its criteria, set by Congress itself, a mechanism to predict 
the likelihood of future misconduct absent section 5. That is, it 
contains criteria to measure the very question reauthorization 
presents. 
B. The Centrality of Bailout 
Reauthorization rests on the view that the world has not 
changed enough, and that the problems that originally propelled 
Congress to enact section 5 have not been adequately remedied. 
But the statute as framed allows for the possibility that this 
judgment is mistaken or might become so with time. Covered 
jurisdictions may escape from the obligation to obtain 
preclearance if they demonstrate their eligibility for what is 
commonly known as bailout.102 Covered jurisdictions can lose the 
covered designation and thereby free themselves of the 
preclearance requirement if they demonstrate their compliance 
with specific statutory criteria.103 
As originally formulated, bailout was only available to 
jurisdictions that had not employed a discriminatory test or 
device for a designated period that Congress kept calibrated to 
the enactment of the section 5 regime in 1965. This requirement 
meant most covered jurisdictions were wholly ineligible for 
bailout, and that consequence was intended.104 Bailout was meant 
to exempt from preclearance those regions that found themselves 
covered under the original trigger or coverage formula but, due 
to the imprecision with that trigger, should not have been 
subjected to the preclearance requirement.105 Jurisdictions able to 
bailout during this period may have employed a test or device in 
a nondiscriminatory fashion, or, after 1975, used English-only 
ballot materials in a region where members of the resident 
qualifying foreign language minority population were fluent in 
English.106 
                                                          
 102. See Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting 
Rights Act: An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 380 (1985). 
 103. Id. at 40911. 
 104. Id. at 381 (Thus, prior to the 1982 amendments, jurisdictions that had 
historically discriminated in the electoral process could not realistically expect to bail out 
until a fixed calendar date arrived.). 
 105. Id. at 39192 & n.62 (citing text of House Report which acknowledges that some 
jurisdictions might be covered yet have no record of discrimination in registering voters 
or conducting elections). 
 106. See J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of The Voting 
Rights Act, in DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON 
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Congress amended the bailout standard in 1982 to excuse 
jurisdictions from preclearance even if they were properly 
covered in the first instance. The change reflected the view that 
section 5, overall, remained necessary due to continuing 
problems of discrimination and widespread failure to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act in the covered jurisdictions.107 It also 
reflected Congresss judgment that some jurisdictions might have 
made sufficient progress to justify excusing them from further 
obligations under section 5.108 Rather than attempting to identify 
these jurisdictions one by one, Congress opted instead to create a 
mechanism under which jurisdictions come forward with 
evidence to adjust on a case-by-case basis Congresss 
presumptive judgment that section 5 remains necessary.109 
Congress retained this version of bailout when it reauthorized 
preclearance in 2006.  
As presently formulated, the bailout provision informs the 
validity of reauthorization in several respects. First, it sets forth 
substantive criteria designed to gauge whether section 5 
obligations may be lifted without adverse consequence. The 
bailout criteria do not focus exclusively, or even primarily, on 
constitutional violations, although intentionally discriminatory 
conduct related to voting renders a covered jurisdiction ineligible 
for bailout.110 Instead, the bailout provision seeks to measure the 
health of minority political participation in the jurisdiction, the 
implication being that where such participation is sufficiently 
vibrant, minority voters can ably protect themselves absent the 
strictures of section 5.111 
                                                          
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 46, on 
file with Author), available at http://www.ucdc.edu/faculty/Voting_Rights/Papers/9%20-
%20Hebert.pdf (tracing the history of the bailout provision from original enactment). 
 107. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 44 (1982). 
 108. See Winke, supra note 8, at 111 (recognizing that the 1982 bailout provision 
opened the door for covered jurisdictions that have sufficiently remedied voting 
discrimination to be exempted). 
 109. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 4546 (1982) (discussing the proposedand subsequently 
passedcommittee bill that allowed individual jurisdictions to come forward with 
evidence of progress with regards to voting discrimination). 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(3) (2000) (No declaratory judgment shall issue under 
this subsection . . . if such plaintiff . . . during the period beginning ten years before the 
date the judgment is issued, engaged in violations . . . unless the plaintiff establishes that 
any such violations were trivial, were promptly corrected, and were not repeated.). 
 111. See Timothy G. ORourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New 
Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765, 782 (1983) (stating broadly that the 
bailout provisions require a jurisdiction [to] demonstrate a record of compliance with the 
Act over the previous ten years, and [to] show that it has taken positive steps both to 
encourage minority political participation and to remove structural barriers to minority 
electoral influence). 
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More specifically, the bailout standard inquires whether the 
jurisdiction has complied with section 5, both in terms of the 
timely submission of proposed changes and actual objections 
interposed by the Attorney General; whether it required the 
presence of federal officials to monitor registration or to observe 
elections; whether the jurisdiction violated section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act or related statutory proscriptions, or entered a 
consent decree in litigation that might have so established; and 
whether the jurisdiction eliminated obstacles to equal political 
participation and made affirmative efforts to expand minority 
participation, by for instance, working to end voter harassment, 
to expand voter registration, and to appoint minority election 
officials. 112 
Because very few jurisdictions have bailed out since 1982,113 
some say that the bailout criteria are too difficult.114 And yet, 
jurisdictions that have attempted to do so typically succeed,115 
suggesting that more might free themselves from coverage were 
they simply to try to navigate the process.116 Indeed, the criteria 
may well be too lenient given that the factors fail to capture a 
host of problems that might hinder minority political 
participation and thus arguably make exemption from section 5 
premature. For example, judicial findings made in litigation 
under section 2 of the VRA provide important details about 
                                                          
 112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000). In summary, the statute holds that a 
jurisdiction can escape coverage if it can establish that, in the last ten years, it: 
(1) has not used a discriminatory test or device in the electoral process that has the 
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote based on race or membership in 
designated language minorities; 
(2) has not been found by a federal court to have denied or abridged the right to vote 
based on race or other protected statute, and has not been party to a consent decree or 
settlement ending such litigation; 
(3) has not required the presence of federal officials to register voters or observe elections; 
(4) has fully complied with section 5, including submitting all changes; and 
(5) has eliminated voting procedures which inhibit or dilute equal access; engaged in 
constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of voters; and engaged in 
other constructive efforts, such as expanding opportunities for convenient registration 
and the appointment of minorities as election officials. Id. 
 113. See Hebert, supra note 106 (manuscript at 20). 
 114. See Richard A. Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A 
Statutory Analysis of the Revised Bailout Provisions, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 42 (1984) 
(arguing that while bailout rules have been liberalized in theory . . . the conditions for 
termination of coverage have been made so restrictive that bailout will continue to be 
impossible for most jurisdictions); cf. Winke, supra note 8, at 72 (describing the bailout 
standard as strict but appropriate). 
 115. See Hebert, supra note 106 (manuscript at 2) (claiming the standards for bailout 
have proven to be both workable and practical). 
 116. But cf. ORourke, supra note 111, at 98 (discussing costs of attempting bailout 
and failing). 
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political participation in defendant jurisdictions.117 Cases in 
which statutory violations are found or consent decrees are 
entered signal problems with minority political participation in 
the jurisdiction. But using litigation of this sort as a lens through 
which to observe such problems necessarily means that a good 
deal of problematic conduct will escape detection, either because 
lawsuits were not filed or litigation was not pursued to finality.118 
 Bailout might have been made contingent on a greater 
showing, and different criteria might also do the job.119 Still, the 
provision as crafted is importantand indeed so important that 
it should provide the measure under which reauthorization is 
reviewedbecause it sets forth Congresss definition of when 
enough is enough. It strikes the balance Congress thought 
appropriate and sensible when it acted in an environment of 
necessary uncertainty, and it confronted the obligation to make a 
judgment about that uncertainty. Under this balance, neither the 
absence of pervasive unconstitutional conduct is sufficient for 
bailout, nor is the elimination of all vestiges of past 
discrimination required. 
In this sense, the bailout criteria parallel the standard the 
Court has developed to gauge whether a school district should be 
released from a desegregation decree.120 Districts achieve 
unitary status, the Court has held, through a combination of 
good faith compliance with the decree and the elimination of 
vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable.121 The 
bailout provision similarly looks at good faith by checking 
whether the jurisdiction has made timely submissions for 
preclearance, and, through the mix of other factors, requires not 
the complete elimination of all vestiges of discrimination, but 
instead a reasonable effort in this regard.122 
                                                          
 117. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 3); see also Ellen Katz et al., Documenting 
Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 65462 (2006). 
 118. See generally Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25). 
 119.  Congress allows counties within covered jurisdictions to bailout independently, 
but a host of governmental entities within counties cannot, unless the county or the state 
as a whole seeks bailout. A pending challenge to reauthorization insists that Congresss 
failure to allow subcounty units to bailout renders the statute constitutionally suspect. 
See generally Complaint, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv-
01384 (D.C.C. filed Aug. 4, 2006), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
mudgonzalescomplaint.pdf. 
 120. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 8889 (1995) (setting forth the standards 
to gauge whether a school district should be released from a desegregation decree). 
 121. Id. at 89 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992)).  
 122. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000). 
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Of course, the analogy between the preclearance regime and 
school desegregation decree is far from complete and important 
differences exist.123 Still, section 5s remedial regime resembles a 
desegregation decree in that it was imposed to address specified, 
unconstitutional conduct, it was not intended to operate in 
perpetuity, and it functions in a context in which local control is 
highly valued. While I think the standards for relief from both 
are too lenient,124 the similarities between the two suggest that 
the balance Congress reached in framing the bailout standard is 
neither unprecedented nor irresponsible. 
The bailout provision, moreover, does not simply define 
circumstances that justify releasing individual jurisdictions from 
the preclearance requirement. It also offers a lens through which 
to gauge how Congress viewed the record before it when it 
reauthorized preclearance. Had Congress declined to reauthorize 
preclearance entirely or, more narrowly, chosen to exempt 
particular covered jurisdictions from the preclearance obligation, 
it would, for all practical purposes, have bailed out the 
jurisdictions involved. Congress opted to reauthorizate the 
statute and retain the bailout provision, and thereby suggested 
its belief that covered jurisdictions were not yet in sufficient 
compliance with the bailout criteria to be freed from the section 5 
obligations.  
The record underlying reauthorization supports this judgment 
and suggests widespread noncompliance with the bailout criteria.125 
Congress collected evidence documenting hundreds of examples of 
apparently unconstitutional conduct by public officials in covered 
jurisdictions,126 dozens of instances in which federal officials have 
been sent to covered jurisdictions to monitor elections;127 a 
                                                          
 123. Compare Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 8889 (setting forth the standards to gauge 
whether a school district should be released from a desegregation decree), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(a)(1) (2000) (setting forth the standards for the bailout provision). 
 124. See David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and 
the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1115 (2004) (arguing that relief from 
desegregation decrees may be too easy to achieve). 
 125. See generally Katz, supra note 5 ; Katz et al., supra note 117, at 65461. 
 126. Katz et al., supra note 117, at 67885; see also Peyton McCrary, Christopher 
Seaman & Richard Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme 
Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 29299 
(2006) (finding that the preclearance process has repeatedly blocked proposed electoral 
changes based on evidence of bad intent). 
 127. Voting Rights Act: Sections 6 and 8The Federal Examiner and Observer 
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 47 (2005) (statement of Barry H. Weinberg, former Deputy Chief 
of the Voting Rights Division, Department of Justice); id. at 63 (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers, Jr.); id. at 195 (statement of Bradley J. Schlozman, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Atty Gen., Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice); id. at 264 (Letter from William 
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widespread failure of covered jurisdictions to make timely 
submission of their proposed changes, and 627 objections interposed 
since 1982,128 albeit at a declining rate in recent years; 129 
constructive efforts by covered jurisdictions to increase minority 
registration and turnout,130 but also evidence indicating that 
minority participation continues to lag in many areas, that covered 
jurisdictions continue to employ dilutive electoral devices, and that, 
in many places, minority voters continue to face harassment in 
seeking to register and vote.131 The record documented that, since 
1982, federal courts reached outcomes favorable to plaintiffs in 
sixty-eight published decisions involving a section 2 claim brought 
against a covered jurisdiction.132  
Congresss decision to reauthorize section 5 based on this 
record embodies the judgment that minority political participation 
in covered jurisdictions was not yet so secure as to render 
preclearance obsolete. To the extent that any specific covered 
jurisdiction might demonstrate otherwise now or in the coming 
years, the bailout provision carves out the path for doing so. 
As such, bailout informs the validity of reauthorization in an 
additional respect. It clarifies the nature of the regime 
reauthorization imposes.133 When Congress voted to extend 
preclearance last summer, it did not conclusively bind covered 
jurisdictions to the strictures of section 5 for the next quarter 
century. Instead, it renewed what has been since 1982 a 
rebuttable presumption that preclearance remains a necessary 
remedy. And it placed on covered jurisdictions the burden to 
show otherwise by demonstrating their compliance with the 
statutory criteria set forth in the bailout provision.134 The 
obligation to seek preclearance should accordingly be understood 
not as an inexorable command but instead as a temporally and 
                                                          
Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability 
Office, to Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Rep. Henry Waxman, and Rep. John Conyers, Jr.). 
 128. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the ActHistory, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
104224 (2005) (appendix to statement of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Atty 
Gen., Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice).  
 129. Id. at 10 (statement of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Atty Gen., Civil 
Rights Division, Department of Justice).  
 130. Id. at 12. 
 131. See id. at 8082 (statement of Anita S. Earls, Director of Advocacy, UNC Center 
for Civil Rights). 
 132. Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at Figure 1). 
 133. See Winke, supra note 8, at 111 (arguing that bailout was required to cut the 
potentially overbroad preclearance remedy down to a size congruent with the problem of 
persistent racial discrimination in voting). 
 134. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000). 
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geographically limited default regime applicable to those 
jurisdictions, already held to have been properly covered in the 
first instance,135 that are unable or unwilling to make their case 
for bailout. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Professor Karlan fully appreciates the complex ways race 
continues to infect political processes in covered jurisdictions, 
and her vigorous defense of reauthorization is propelled by her 
firm conviction that gains in minority political participation are 
too recent and too fragile to render preclearance obsolete.136 
Professor Karlan also values the ways in which section 5 remains 
a targeted and circumscribed statute. She views bailout as an 
important component of the preclearance regime,137 and sees the 
record underlying the statute as confirmation that the statute 
remains needed.138 
Professor Karlan nevertheless posits a vision of 
congressional power so broad that reauthorization would stand 
even if Congress acted on no record whatsoever and dispensed 
with bailout entirely. Indeed, her vision would allow Congress to 
make preclearance much more difficult to obtain,139 or vastly to 
expand the types of decisions subject to preclearance.140 Under 
Professor Karlans vision, Congress could make section 5 
permanent, or subject the entire country to its strictures. 
Congress, of course, never seriously considered enacting any 
of these changes, and its refusal to do so provides support for 
Professor Karlans claim that deference is appropriate. The 
political process itself might just ensure that preclearance 
remains within circumscribed bounds, or at least might police 
those bounds as effectively as the Court might hope to do. But if 
Im right that Professor Karlans vision of congressional power 
would allow Congress to expand vastly the reach of section 5, the 
Roberts Court may well be uneasy with Professor Karlans vision. 
                                                          
 135. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (upholding section 5 
as extended in 1975); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 13134 (1970) (upholding section 
5 as extended in 1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966) 
(upholding section 5 as enacted in 1965). 
 136. See generally Karlan, supra note 1, at 2122. 
 137. Id. at 2627. 
 138. Id. at 23. 
 139. Cf. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 47778 (1997) (holding that a 
violation of section 2 of the VRA is not grounds to deny preclearance under section 5). 
 140. Cf. Presley v. Etowah County Commn, 502 U.S. 491, 509 (1992) (holding that 
changes in the allocation of power among elected officials are not changes with respect to 
voting subject to preclearance under section 5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000))). 
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If the Justices arent wholly convinced that Congress enjoys 
as much power as Professor Karlan thinks, we should remind 
them that Professor Karlan has offered us more than is needed to 
sustain the statute that was authorized. Reauthorization targets 
political processes that remain compromised by race, 
compromised in ways that reflect past discrimination and 
portend future misconduct. As such, it targets electoral practices 
of the sort that the Court has held fall within congressional 
power to regulate. It does so through a remedial regime that is 
circumscribedgeographically, temporally, through the 
rebuttable presumption the bailout provision embodies, and the 
detailed record that underlies it. 
Indeed, the ways in which the preclearance regime remains 
circumscribed may well prove critical to its survival precisely 
because the Roberts Court may be more comfortable with the 
amount of power reauthorization of this statute requires. 
Sometimes just enough is plenty. 
